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 I 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the next 50 years the potential impact on human livelihoods of environmental 
change could be considerable. Increased levels of human mobility may be one 
possible response to climate change. However, there is huge uncertainty about 
precisely how many people will move and about the destinations that will be chosen 
by environmentally driven migrants. This paper seeks to offer some quantitative 
estimates of the scale of uncertainty that surrounds forecasts of environmental 
migration to the UK. A Delphi Survey was used to analyse the opinions of a panel of 
experts. The experts anticipated that environmental migration would rise over the next 
50 years, but had limited confidence in their estimates, pointing to the need to 
consider analysis of the reasons for uncertainty in relation to forecasts of 
environmental mobility. The survey suggests that only a minority of environmentally 
driven migrants will arrive as ‘displacement’ movers. Mediterranean Europe was 
cited as a potential source of environmentally driven migrants to the UK, not because 
this region is most at risk from climate change in global terms but because of the 
relative ease of migration from there to Britain under EU legislation.  
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A DELPHI SURVEY OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UK TO 2060 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the next 50 years the potential impact on human livelihoods of environmental 
change could be considerable (Stern, 2007; House of Commons, 2008). Increased 
levels of human mobility may be one possible response to climate change (Myers, 
1993; Pecoud and Geiger, 2011), but there is huge uncertainty about precisely how 
many people will move and about the destinations that will be chosen by 
environmentally driven migrants. There is only limited quantitative evidence to 
support suggestions that environmental migration will be focused mainly in the poorer 
nations of the Majority World and that regions such as north-west Europe will receive 
few migrants compared with the scale of environmentally driven short distance moves 
that will take place within the Majority World, especially in Asia and Africa (Black et 
al., 2011; Findlay and Geddes, 2011).  
This report seeks to offer some quantitative estimates of the scale of 
environmental migration to one specific destination: the UK. It is part of a wider 
investigation of environmental mobility in many other regions of the world being 
undertaken within a Government Office for Science Foresight project entitled Global 
Environmental Migration. The aims of the wider project are to assess how a broad 
range of environmental factors could, in interaction with other socioeconomic drivers 
of change, influence patterns of migration globally. The specific goal of the current 
independent piece of research is to investigate the best available evidence that can be 
gathered from a panel of migration and environmental experts as well as some policy 
makers and stakeholders on how environmental factors will influence immigration 
and to feed this evidence into a Bayesian forecast of environmental migration to the 
UK by 2060. 
This report provides a quantitative analysis of expert opinions concerning 
migration trends to the UK for the years 2030 and 2060. The expert opinions were 
solicited using a Delphi Survey methodology involving two rounds of engagement.  
It is hoped that the results of the exercise will be helpful in two specific ways: 
1. Through providing a quantitative assessment of expert opinions about levels of 
environmental mobility in relation to overall immigration to the UK.  
2. Through analysis of the levels of uncertainty associated with expert opinions 
about migration trends, and through consideration of the reasons that experts 
gave for their views on current and future trends.   
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The report, for the first time, offers numerical estimates from the people best-
placed to judge the likely scale of environmental mobility to the UK, relative to other 
mobility trends. Of greater importance, it suggests some of the reasons for uncertainty 
relating to these estimates. 
This report commences by describing the methodology that has been used. It then 
progresses to offer a descriptive account of the outcomes of the two rounds of a 
Delphi survey. Finally it offers an interpretation by the authors of the most significant 
findings and why they are important. 
 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
2.1 METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES 
The findings are based on the views of 27 experts, 11 of whom were migration and 
demographic specialists (subsequently referred to collectively as ‘demographers’) and 
16 of whom were stakeholders In the Foresight project (policy makers with a range of 
knowledge of environmental processes as they impact internationally and in the UK, 
civil servants and a number of environmental experts). The latter group are referred to 
hereafter as ‘stakeholders’. The demographers were mainly professors from UK 
universities who have conducted world-respected research on population and 
migration, although some of the demographic panel had previous or current 
experience working in international and national government statistics agencies. The 
policy makers and environmental experts that participated in the survey, along with 
the other stakeholders, were members of the high-level stakeholder group that have 
engaged in advising the Foresight Global Environmental Migration Project. 
Expert views may be gathered in a variety of ways (O’Hagan et al., 2006), but 
one well-established approach used, especially in situations involving long-range 
forecasts of uncertain futures, has been the Delphi approach (Hill and Fowles, 1975; 
Linstone and Turoff, 1975). It has been used in diverse contexts such as forecasting 
technological developments, nursing and medical science, educational and social 
policy and marketing (Weaver, 1971; Yong et al., 1989; Hasson et al., 2000; Holey et 
al., 2007). The Delphi method encourages experts to defend their views in a multi-
round survey that explores the reasons why they have formed specific views of future 
events and processes and that provides expert panels with the opportunity to alter their 
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estimates of future events in round 2 (and subsequent survey rounds) in the light of 
the extra information made available to them from other panel members.  
The approach has been used in the academic literature in a number of different 
ways and is accepted as a credible and legitimate way of handling uncertainty in a 
forecasting context (Schmidt, 1997). Examples of recent peer-reviewed scientific 
journal papers such as those in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society that 
advocate this approach to migration forecasting include Bijak and Wisniowski (2010). 
It has also been recognised in standard academic texts on migration modelling 
(Raymer and Willekens, 2008).  
In round 1 of the Delphi survey respondents independently completed a 
questionnaire on current and future environmental migration trends to the UK. In 
round 2 the aggregated questionnaire responses were presented to the same panel of 
experts at a specially convened meeting in central London. At this meeting, 
participants were given the opportunity to see the views of other experts and to 
discuss them. They were then asked to either affirm or change their initial estimates. 
The questionnaire was based on a similar format that had previously been tried and 
tested by Wisniowski and Bijak (2009). The researchers considered round 2 of the 
Delphi survey particularly important, because this provided an opportunity for experts 
to converge in the definitions they were deploying in relation to ‘environmental 
mobility’.  
While secondary data sources exist (such as those prepared by the Office for 
National Statistics), which inform experts about the overall level of immigration to 
the UK, no secondary sources were available to guide experts on previous trends in 
environmental mobility to the UK. As a result the round 2 meeting was deemed 
essential to allow experts to agree not only what types of moves might be considered 
as being linked to environmental change, but also to form a more informed view of 
the scale of the phenomenon. Inevitably, experts found this a difficult task because 
they were forced not only to evaluate the weight of evidence available to stakeholders 
on the Foresight steering group relating to future climate trends, but also to consider 
the extent to which environmental change would contribute to an inflation of existing 
channels of immigration in relation, for example, to flows of highly skilled workers, 
students, persons engaged in family reunion and so on. The exchange of views 
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between experts was recorded at the round 2 meeting and the transcripts were 
analysed by the researchers. Some quotations from this event are included in this 
paper alongside the migration estimates. This is done to offer the reader some 
understanding of the concepts that were deemed important by the experts in their 
formation of migration forecasts.  
The Delphi questionnaire covered eight substantive topics (see Appendix A 
for a copy of the round 2 questionnaire): (i) Estimated gross immigration by 2030, (ii) 
Estimated gross immigration by 2060, (iii) Current level of immigration related to 
environmental change, (iv) Proportions of immigration in 2030 and 2060 due to 
environmental change; (v) Sources of environmentally driven migrants by 2060, (vi) 
Demographic drivers of immigration to the UK, (vii) Economic drivers of 
immigration to the UK, (viii) Return migration to the UK due to adverse 
environmental change. The number of responses to each question is shown in each of 
the figures below. These do not always equal 27 because not all respondents answered 
all of the questions. 
Although the survey covered eight topic areas, the purpose of the survey was 
to achieve better understanding of environmental migration, with the other 
information gathered being collected because of its contextual importance. The Office 
for National Statistics produces assumptions on future levels of net migration based 
on past trends, which are used in producing the national population projections for the 
UK and our purpose in this research was not to challenge the well-tested methods that 
they use. Migration is well known to be the most difficult component of population 
change to measure and also to predict. A review of the accuracy of past national 
projections (Shaw, 2007) found that over the last 40 years net migration has tended to 
be under-projected (relative to what has subsequently been observed). The review also 
showed that the mean and absolute errors in their net migration assumptions increase 
the further into the future the projection goes. It concludes that although the average 
absolute error associated with net migration has increased over the time period 
reviewed because of the increase seen in net migration levels, this could be quite 
different in future assessments of projections were net migration levels to fall (Shaw, 
2007: 21). To examine long-range forecasts of environmental migration to the UK, 
the researchers therefore felt that there was added value in consulting experts using 
the Delphi approach to discover whether new insights might be achieved about one 
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type of mobility on which the UK gathers no systematic data and yet which could 
potentially have a significant impact on overall levels of gross immigration when one 
looks forward 50 years. Gross migration was taken as the focus of interest rather than 
net migration because it was judged to be easier to interpret expert opinion in terms of 
the impacts of environmental change on movement in one direction of flow at a time, 
and from the researchers’ standpoint it was felt that immigration was of greater 
concern than outmigration, as well as being a source of greater uncertainty in UK 
population forecasting than gross outmigration.  
 
2.2 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS RELATING TO ISSUES OF 
STATISTICAL CONFIDENCE 
The researchers recognise that from the outset the survey involves at least two 
different sources of uncertainty – the first is the scale of future migration and the 
second is the scale of mobility arising from the uncertain impacts of future 
environmental change. The interaction of migration processes and environmental 
change processes increases the uncertainty about the future outcomes observed, but in 
no way does it diminish the importance of researching the topic. It does mean, 
however, that from the outset the researchers were eager to measure the confidence 
that experts felt about their estimates both about overall gross immigration trends and 
specifically about environmental migration. Measures of confidence were obtained on 
a 100-point scale, ranging from 1 (very unsure) up to 100 (very sure). The 
questionnaire asked about respondents’ confidence for all point estimates of future 
levels of migration and percentages of environmentally driven migrants.  
The 100-point scale was used in this survey in an attempt to extend and adapt 
previous work by Bijak and Wisniowski (2010) in which an 11-point scale was used 
in a similar Delphi survey of migration trends undertaken in other European countries. 
This previous research used this scale to provide a measure of uncertainty surrounding 
respondents’ answers. The 100-point scale was deployed on this occasion to ascertain 
respondents’ level of confidence in their answers about future levels of mobility and 
was intended for use in interpreting the answers to the Delphi survey. Note that the 
questions measuring confidence were not aimed at eliciting confidence intervals. 
Given the heterogeneity of the expert panel, we could not assume that a question 
requiring a statistical background would be understood consistently across the 
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respondents. Instead, a subjective score with a wide range of options (1 to 100) was 
intended to allow the experts more flexibility and scope for manoeuvre between both 
Delphi rounds. 
During the second round of the Delphi some respondents raised issues with the 
use of the 1 to 100 scale, and the placing of their level of uncertainty, especially in the 
middle of the range. These concerns are legitimate. However, as pointed out by the 
literature on elicitation (Szreder and Osiewalski, 1992; Kadane and Wolfson, 1998; 
Dey and Liu, 2007; O’Hagan 2011), obtaining information about uncertainty is 
universally difficult and so far no satisfactory solution has been proposed (O’Hagan et 
al., 2006). In addition, during the second round of the Delphi survey, when faced with 
all responses from the first round, the participants were able to move towards a shared 
understanding of the scale and the underlying concept of subjective uncertainty. In 
some cases respondents may have also adjusted their uncertainty estimates in light of 
the discussions. Hence, the second round responses to questions on uncertainty reflect 
subjective views of individual respondents relative to the whole expert panel.  
The remaining challenge is how to translate the uncertainty scales to 
probability distributions of the target values. This is addressed in the final (Bayesian 
modelling) stage of the current study, and discussed in a separate report for the 
Government Office for Science (Abel et al., 2011). 
 
3. CURRENT AND FUTURE LEVELS OF IMMIGRATION AND 
IMMIGRATION RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE  
In the discussion that follows, basic descriptive statistics are presented for the round 2 
results of the Delphi survey. The figures (e.g. Figure 1) offer a graphical summary of 
the findings using grouped categories, whereas the tables show means and medians 
based on the individual returns from the 27 experts. Except in a few instances, 
commentary is restricted to the trends indicated for all 27 returns, although the tables 
also show the disaggregated results for the responses from demographers and 
stakeholders. 
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3.1 IMMIGRATION IN 2030  
Figure 1 and Table 1 display experts’ estimates of the gross volume of immigrants 
that the UK will receive in 2030. Most participants estimated that levels of gross 
immigration in 2030 would be slightly lower (530,192) than the 567,000 immigrants 
to the UK recorded in 2009.  
 
Consider the following comment which illustrates how one of the panel members 
interpreted his/her position during the Delphi panel discussions:  
 
‘My expectation would be that a lot of the future growth poles globally are 
going to be in the emerging economies and not in OECD economies. And I 
would also make the assumption that British immigration policy will not allow 
in so many migrants… so it is not just a simple matter of economics, we’ll still 
see some immigration but I suspect that it will be lower’.  
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
 
Most thought that the level would be slightly over half a million immigrants in 
2030 but 11 respondents estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 immigrants 
would enter the country in 2030. Demographers produced lower estimates than 
stakeholders but produced estimates whose variance (standard deviation) around the 
mean was much less than other experts. Although the figure indicates some variation 
of views across the Delphi panel, there was quite strong consensus with 19 of the 26 
respondents suggesting that by 2030 immigration would fall in the range 400,000–
800,000 persons.  
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders  
Mean  530,192 520,454 537,333 
Median  562,500 575,000 500,000 
Standard deviation  195,450  137,304 233,711 
 
Table 1. Estimates of level of gross immigration in 2030, averages and standard deviations 
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Figure 1: Estimates of level of gross immigration to the UK in the year 2030 (N: 26)  
 
3.2 IMMIGRATION IN 2060  
Figure 2 and Table 2 display the experts’ estimates of the gross number of immigrants 
that the UK will receive in 2060. The results are more dispersed than the figures for 
2030, but the mean and median figures do not change greatly from the level of 
immigration in 2009. Compared with 2030 where only one expert anticipated gross 
immigration to exceed 800,000, by 2060 four members of the panel gave higher 
figures and this had an influence on the mean value reported for the group as a whole. 
Despite this there remained quite a strong consensus (16 of 26 responses) that the 
level of immigration would be contained within the range 400,000–800,000 persons. 
Again, it may be helpful to consider the comment of one of the participants in the 
Delphi panel, indicating how they interpreted their estimate of gross immigration: 
 
‘I focused on how desirable this country will be in 50 years from now and for 
me it is going to be a less desirable country. Southeast Asia will develop so it 
will become more attractive but I believe that people will continue to see this 
country as a desirable place to live in. But you also have to take into 
consideration the impact of this government and movements in other countries 
to control migration so I do not think that immigration to the UK will change 
that much’. 
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
Demographers and stakeholders produced broadly comparable estimates, 
although the latter group once again contained much more variance than the former. 
For both groups the variance around the mean was much greater than in 2030.  
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Figure 2: Estimates of level of gross immigration to the UK in 2060 (N: 26)  
 
 
 
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders  
Mean  544,423 534,545 551,667 
Median  525,000 550,000 500,000 
Standard deviation  314,402 187,423 388,962 
 
Table 2: Estimates of gross immigration in 2060, averages and standard deviations  
 
Figure 3 displays respondents’ views on the shape of the best fit curve relating 
to general trends in gross immigration to 2060 (see Annex, Question 6). The 
responses show a great diversity of views. Many experts believed that immigration 
would increase in some way (12 responses). A smaller number expected immigration 
to decrease (eight responses) and some anticipated that levels would remain largely 
constant (four responses). The diverse range of responses may reflect very high levels 
of uncertainty about future migration trends, even in the minds of demographic 
experts, once one attempts to estimate as far ahead as 2060. This is a key contextual 
factor that has to be kept in mind by anyone wanting to forecast environmental 
migration, because this forms a subset of the gross volume of immigration i.e. part of 
the uncertainty of forecasting environmental migration is related to the broader 
uncertainty associated with forecasting migration per se.  
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In round 2 the experts were alerted to the average trend but despite this there 
was no convergence in the responses to the question about the shape of the best fit 
curve to 2060. Some argued that trends to 2060 were captured by an oscillation 
around current numbers that could be interpreted as approximating to the response 
‘constant’ shown in Figure 3, whereas others noted that the responses ‘ever slower 
decrease’ and ‘other’ were compatible with the mean trend.  
Figure 4 shows long-term immigration predictions disaggregated according to 
area of expertise. The results are broadly similar, with one interesting exception. It 
was uniquely the stakeholders who predicted an ever slower decrease in immigration.  
 
 Figure 3: Long-term gross immigration trend to 2060 (N: 26)  
 
Figure 4: Long-term gross immigration trend to 2060, demographers and stakeholders (N: 26)  
0
1
2
3
4
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Demographers Civil servants
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4. LEVELS OF IMMIGRATION RELATED TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
Turning to the main focus of interest, Figure 5 and Table 3 indicate that most 
respondents were of the view that environmental change plays only a minor role in 
current immigration flows into the UK. The median response from the experts 
suggests that around 5% of current immigration is either directly or indirectly the 
result of factors associated with environmental change. The mean statistic for round 1 
was particularly strongly affected by a single high response. At the round 2 Delphi 
meeting all but one of the experts dismissed this response as highly improbable and 
no defence was offered by this expert for their extremely high estimate. For this 
reason, in Figure 5 and Table 3 this result is excluded. An important feature of the 
results that may be hidden in the figures is that five experts felt that there was 
currently no immigration to the UK because of environmental change. Consider the 
following comment: 
‘I am of the view that we get very few if any environmental migrants and 
that’s because I think that migration is overwhelmingly an economic decision 
or outcome’  
 (Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
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Figure 5: Percentage of current immigration related to factors associated with environmental 
change (N: 27), rounds 1 and 2  
 
 
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  4.81 3.6 5.56 
Median  5.00 4.50 5.00 
Standard deviation  3.93 2.59 4.34 
 
Table 3: Percentage of current migration related to environmental change, averages and standard 
deviations (data from round 2 and excluding the outlier)  
 
 
Figures 6 and 7 extend the analysis to 2030 and 2060. The spread of values 
increase over time and the mean values also rise. The experts estimated that by 2030 
around 10% of immigration will be due to environmental change (i.e. approximately 
double the 2009 level). By 2060 the median value rises to 15% and the variance of the 
responses also increases.  
 
‘The environmental ‘ifs’ get so great fifty years into the future that there is a 
lot of uncertainty’  
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
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Figure 6: Percentage of immigration in 2030 due to environmental change (N: 26)  
 
 
  
Figure 7: Percentage of immigration in 2060 due to environmental change  (N: 25)  
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  All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  11.85 10.36 12.93 
Median  10.00 8.00 10.00 
Standard deviation  9.83 11.07 9.06 
 
Table 4: Estimates of percentage of immigration in 2030 due to environmental change 
 
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  16.80 14.73 18.43 
Median  15.00 12.00 15.00 
Standard deviation  13.90 14.23 13.94 
 
Table 5: Estimates of percentage of immigration in 2060 due to environmental change 
 
Figure 8 shows the overall trend in average values (means) from 2009 to 2060 
expressed in terms of the percentage of all immigration, whereas Table 6 shows the 
results for the same time span but converts the values into absolute numbers. Figure 9 
is interesting because, even though gross immigration is predicted to decline slightly, 
the experts anticipate a rise in the proportion of this flow made up of environmental 
movers. One of the key findings of the Delphi survey is therefore that the experts 
judge that the proportion of environmental migration will increase over time in a 
context that involves a decline in the gross overall level of immigration to the UK. 
From this information it was possible for the researchers to calculate estimates of the 
absolute level of environmental migration to the UK in 2030 and 2060, using each 
individual respondent’s estimates of gross immigration and the proportion of 
immigration due to environmental change. The results are shown in Table 6. The 
experts were never however presented with these calculations and did not therefore 
have an opportunity to reflect on the possible significance of their estimates.  
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Figure 8: Average estimates of proportion of immigration to UK due to environmental change (%); 
2009, 2030 and 2060  
 
 
 2009 2030 2060 
Average estimate 
of immigration 567,000 530,192 544,423 
Average estimate 
of environmental 
immigration 
4.81% 10.72% 16.80% 
Average predicted 
volume of 
environmental 
migrants*  
27,260 53,202 80,975  
Table 6: Mean volume of predicted environmentally driven migrants 2009, 2030 and 2060 based 
on estimates of gross immigration and proportion of immigration due to environmental change   
Note: *Calculated using each individual respondent’s estimates of gross immigration and 
proportion of immigration due to environmental change. These numbers were then totalled and 
divided by the number of respondents to produce the average figure 
 
 
We return to thinking about how these results might be interpreted later in this 
report, but first it is useful to report on the level of confidence that the experts had in 
their results.  
 
4.1 ESTIMATING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION WITH CONFIDENCE 
The short methods section with which this report opened highlighted the importance 
of analysing uncertainty. Uncertainty estimates were requested from respondents for 
all answers. Here we focus only on those responses that relate to the double 
uncertainty of estimating the proportion of immigration driven by uncertain outcomes 
from environmental change. The focus on uncertainty is important, because as will be 
4
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revealed later in the report (Tables 17–19), the experts that showed most confidence 
in their estimates of environmental mobility were those making forecasts at the low 
end of the range. This finding in turn had significant impacts on the way the 
researchers interpreted the outcomes of the Delphi survey, especially as a tool for 
eliciting key parameters that would shape the next stage of their work in preparing 
Bayesian forecasts of environmental migration to 2060 (Abel et al., 2011). Our 
attention therefore turns now to investigating in greater depth the confidence or 
uncertainty revealed by the panels of experts in their estimates of environmental 
migration.  
Figures 9–11 indicate a trend over time, from relatively high certainty about 
estimates of current low levels of environmental migration to moderate confidence in 
estimates of rising but still low levels of environmental migration by 2030 (14 of the 
26 respondents were 50% confident or better in their estimates). Although by 2060 the 
upward trend is clear in the proportion of immigrants to UK that will be driven, at 
least in part, by environmental factors (Figure 8), uncertainty levels rise very 
significantly with only 9 of the 26 experts expressing even 50% confidence in their 
estimates. This increase in uncertainty seemed to be specifically associated with a 
lack of clarity relating to the environmental impact on migration, because estimates of 
gross immigration to 2060 showed much less erosion in confidence (15 of 25 
responses were still 50% confident or better – Table 10).  
 
‘Well my lack of confidence in my answer was due to my lack of confidence 
in understanding what environmental migration actually is’  
(Expert comment, London, 21 March 2011) 
An interesting additional feature of the survey was that demographers were 
consistently more confident in their estimates of environmental migration than 
stakeholders although the gap diminishes with the passage of time (Tables 6–8). The 
gap between demographers and stakeholders in relation to their confidence over gross 
immigration trends to 2060 was less marked (Table 10). 
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Figure 9: Confidence in estimate of current immigration relating to environmental change (N: 27)  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Confidence in estimate of proportion of immigration in 2030 that will be related to 
environmental change (N: 26)  
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Figure 11: Confidence in estimate of proportion of immigration in 2060 that will be related to 
environmental change (N: 25)  
 
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders  
Mean  55.41 63.18 50.06 
Median  50 60 50 
Standard deviation  24.55 28.22 20.95 
 
Table 7: Confidence in level of current migration related to environmental change, averages and 
standard deviations 
 
 
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  44.04 50 39.67 
Median  50 50 50 
Standard deviation  19.24 20.62 17.57 
 
Table 8: Confidence in proportion of immigration in 2030 that will be related to environmental 
change, averages and standard deviations 
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 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  34.2 36.82 32.14 
Median  30 30 27.5 
Standard deviation  23.03 24.42 22.59 
 
Table 9: Confidence in proportion of immigration in 2060 that will be related to environmental 
change, averages and standard deviations 
 
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  41.73 49.55 36 
Median  50 50 30 
Standard deviation  21.86 20.18 21.89 
 
Table 10: Confidence in relation to prediction of long-term immigration trend to 2060, averages and 
standard deviations 
 
Ahead of the second round of the Delphi survey, it had been anticipated that 
experts might grow in confidence as a result of seeing their estimates set in the 
context of the overall responses to the survey. In practice the discussion between 
experts seems to have had little impact on the confidence that they attached to their 
responses (see Table 11 below). The results reported in Table 11 affirm the view that 
the confidence attached to expert estimates decreases, as one would expect, as one 
moves from estimates of current environmental migration to estimates of events in 
2060.  
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Confidence attached to…  
Mean confidence level 
Round 1 Round 2 
Current environmental 
immigration  55.24 55.41 
Environmental 
migration 2030 44.21 44.04 
Environmental 
migration 2060 37.33 34.20 
Displacement migrants 
2060 37.50 38.20 
 
Table 11: Average confidence attached to responses, rounds 1 and 2 
 
 
4.2 SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTALLY DRIVEN MIGRANTS BY 2060  
Figure 12 shows the locations that respondents thought would be the most important 
sources of environmental migration by 2060. Each respondent was restricted to 
identifying the two most likely sources. Most respondents predicted that sub-Saharan 
Africa and South and Southeast Asia would be the most important regions. One expert 
commented: 
‘I picked these regions and that is because still in the back of my mind I have 
this notion that the economy and economic differentials are going to be the 
key drivers. So environmental change combined with economic differentials in 
these places will result in immigration’.  
(Expert comment, London, March, 2011) 
A number of respondents selected southern Europe, commenting that they did 
so, not because it will be more severely affected by environmental change by 2060, 
but because people who live there will be freer to move to the UK than non-EU 
citizens.  
The following quote illustrates this position: 
‘I think this is another question where the policy consideration is difficult 
because I answered it by assuming that you only had free movement within 
Europe and not from the rest of the world – so I put southern Europe’.  
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
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Figure 12: Top two sources of environmental migrants to the UK by 2060  (N: 26)  
For these reasons an additional question was included in round 2 of the Delphi 
which asked respondents to gauge the likelihood of intra-European migration to the 
UK resulting from environmental change by 2030 (Figure 13).   
Most respondents thought it was possible that EU citizens living in others 
parts of Europe might move to the UK as a consequence of adverse environmental 
change by 2030. Seventeen of the 22 respondents thought that it was possible, 
probable or very probable that this would occur whereas five felt it was unlikely.  
The survey finding that the vast majority of experts consider EU countries to 
be a possible source of future environmental migration to the UK is significant, 
because most of the environmental change literature focuses popular attention on 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa as the most probable sources of environmental 
migration. The latter view ignores expert understanding of migration systems that 
emphasises the much greater probability of mobility occurring over shorter distances.  
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Figure 13: Likelihood of intra-European migration to the UK due to adverse environmental change 
by 2030 (N: 22) 
 
 
4.3 DISPLACEMENT MIGRATION TO THE UK BY 2060  
The Foresight Project makes a key distinction between environmental change that 
leads to displacement migration and change that simply drives longer-run trends in 
mobility. Hazard events such as flooding or tsunamis, for example, might be thought 
of as creating a need for immediate population displacement while sea-level rise 
provides an obvious example of a kind of environmental change necessitating 
population relocation. Displacement and environmental mobility therefore have very 
different policy implications. In estimating environmental migration to the UK, it was 
therefore felt desirable to explore, via the Delphi survey, the proportion of future 
environmental migration that might be attributed to displacement-type moves.   
 
Figure 14 and Table 12 show expert views on the level of environment-related 
migration to the UK by 2060 involving displacement migrants. Most respondents held 
the view that displacement migrants will constitute only a minority of environmental 
migrants to the UK by 2060, with the mean predicted proportion being 16%.  
‘I think most immigration to the UK is driven by economic forces, although 
environmental change factors may play a role in some cases… but I would 
think that displacement migrants are more likely to stay in their countries or 
move to neighbouring countries’ . 
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
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As Figure 14 shows, there were four respondents that held very different 
views from the rest of the panel, expecting that more than 40% of all environmental 
migrants by 2060 would be displacement movers. The views of this group contrast 
strongly with the modal response suggesting that only 5% of all environmentally 
driven migrants to the UK by 2060 will be of this kind. Confidence in responses to 
this question was, however, low (Table 13). 
Figure 14: Proportion of environment-related migrants to the UK in 2060 that will be displacement 
migrants (N: 26)  
 
 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  16.42 15.55 17.07 
Median  10 10 10 
Standard deviation  15.56 16.56 15.35 
Table 12: Proportion of environment-related migrants to the UK in 2060 that will be displacement 
migrants, averages and standard deviations 
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 All responses Demographers  Stakeholders 
Mean  37.5 37.73 37.33 
Median  35 30 40 
Standard deviation  22.81 26.59 20.6 
Table 13: Confidence regarding proportion of environment-related migrants to the UK in 2060 that 
will be displacement migrants, averages and standard deviations 
 
 
5. DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF 
IMMIGRATION TO THE UK  
The Foresight Project makes an important distinction between ‘Environmental’ and 
‘Non-environmental’ drivers of migration. The two types of mobility were defined as 
follows: 
‘Environmental’ drivers – drivers of migration associated with a change in ‘ecosystem 
services’ and ‘exposure to hazard’, and ‘Non-environmental’ drivers of migration, 
which fall into any of the following four categories of ‘Political’, ‘Economic’, 
‘Social’ and ‘Demographic’ drivers. To quote the Project definitions, non-
environmental drivers can be: 
• Influenced by environmental change (examples here are employment 
opportunities); 
• Not themselves influenced by environmental change, but could interact with (the 
effects of) environment change to affect future migration flows.   
The Delphi survey investigated how the panel of experts felt each of the main 
drivers might impact on future migration (and consequently on environmental 
migration to the UK). The results are reported below, although the main purpose of 
these parts of the survey was to inform the Bayesian forecasting of the different 
scenarios identified by the Foresight panel. 
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5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UK  
Figure 15 shows the predicted impact of a high global population growth rate, 
increasing the global population from 6.8 billion in 2011 to 9.1 billion by 2060, on 
immigration to the UK. Most respondents (16 out of 24) felt that such an increase 
would lead to steady or even faster growth in immigration levels.  
‘If the population of the rest of the world increases then that will increase the 
pressure on immigration levels into the UK’  
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
Five did not feel that it would be important. Figure 16 displays similar results 
for a question worded in a slightly different way, asking about the impact of 
substantial population growth in the Global South on immigration to the UK, 2011–
60. 
 
Figure 15: Impact of global population growth on immigration to the UK, 2011–60 (N: 24)  
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Figure 16: Impact of population growth in the Global South on immigration to the UK, 2011–60 (N: 20)  
The predicted impact of changes in the global dependency ratio (with an 
ageing population in the Global North and a relatively young population in the Global 
South) on immigration to the UK between 2011 and 2060 is shown in Figure 17. Most 
respondents predicted that a relatively young population in the Global South and an 
ageing population in the Global North would lead to a steady or even faster growth in 
immigration to the UK (12 out of 19 responses). Five respondents did not think that 
changes in the global dependency ratio would have an important impact on 
immigration to the UK. For example, consider the following comment: 
‘I just think that more and more countries in the developed world will try to 
bridge the demographic gap that will be increasing. I mean some countries 
have already put in place immigration policies that even implicitly try to 
bridge the demographic and labour market gap and I think more and more 
countries will have those kinds of policies to try and keep the population 
growing somehow and the labour market growing’  
(Expert comment, London, March, 2011) 
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Figure 17: Impact of changes in global dependency ratio on immigration to the UK 2011–60 (N: 19)  
 
5.2 ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UK  
In a similar vein, Figure 18 suggests that experts were more or less agreed that strong 
economic growth in the Global North would have a positive relationship with 
immigration numbers to the UK. Although there was a variation in opinion about the 
strength of the impact on immigration, the relative unanimity of the panel about the 
positive relation between economic growth and immigration to UK is helpful in terms 
of modelling future immigration scenarios.   
Figure 19 provides the contrasting pattern for strong economic growth in the 
Global South. The majority of respondents to this question predicted that this would 
lead to growth in immigration to the UK (13 out of 18 responses), but some experts 
anticipated that it could lead to a decline in immigration as populations in sending 
countries ceased to see the UK as attractive.  
‘Many of us didn't predict the pace of change in China for example. So 
economic growth in South and Southeast Asia is a huge factor. And as that 
continues apace in the region... what would be an attractive place to relocate 
to? If it was me I wouldn't be looking at England I'd be looking at Australia or 
Thailand or Indonesia or China but not the UK… so for me the issue is where 
is an attractive place to be in the future, and it is not necessarily England.  
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
 
 28 
Arguably of greater importance than absolute economic growth rates is the 
effect of the level of economic disparity in driving levels of population migration 
(Figure 20). Here there was once again a strong level of agreement among experts.  
 
Figure 18: Impact of strong economic growth in the Global North on immigration to the UK, 2011–60 
(N: 18)  
 
 
Figure 19: Impact of strong economic growth in the Global South on immigration to the UK, 2011–60 
(N: 18)  
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Figure 20: Impact of increased economic disparities between Global North and Global South on 
immigration to the UK, 2011–60 (N: 24)  
 
Nearly everyone (20 out of 24 responses) thought that increased economic 
disparity would drive more immigration to the UK, although there was some variation 
in how strongly the effect would be observed. It was interesting that many 
respondents on the panel commented that they regarded this question as hypothetical. 
This was because they saw economic disparities between the Global North and Global 
South as declining over the next 50 years.   
 
 
5.3 RETURN MIGRATION TO THE UK DUE TO ADVERSE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE  
The final question in the survey asked respondents about the likelihood that UK 
citizens currently living abroad would return to the UK as a result of adverse 
environmental change by 2060. The results are displayed in Figure 21 below. Nearly 
half of the participants felt that this scenario was possible (12 out of 26 respondents), 
whereas four deemed it unlikely. Those that thought it probable expected return flows 
to occur from among the British expatriate community currently living along the 
Mediterranean shores of Europe.  
‘I think we will see a partial return because of the million plus Brits in Spain 
or whatever number there is. It will get very uncomfortable for them but not 
throughout the year. So some people will return to the UK just for the summer 
and that actually happens already’.  
(Expert comment, London, March 2011) 
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Figure 21: Likelihood of return migration of UK citizens currently living abroad because of adverse 
environmental change by 2060 (N: 26)  
 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF ESTIMATES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 
In the first part of this report the main results of the Delphi survey have been reported 
in relation to each of the topics covered by the questionnaire. No attempt has been 
made, however, to interpret the relationships between different results, and this the 
task that we turn to here.  
First, it is important to note that the relatively small sample size makes it 
improbable that inferential tests would show statistical differences that might be 
observed with 99% or even 95% confidence. For example, the differences observed 
between the results reported by demographers and stakeholders have been noted in the 
text, but although the tendencies identified are clear from the tables, in none of the 
cases did a Student’s t-test for difference of means or a chi-square test reveal a 
statistically significant difference with p = 0.05.  
Second, experts were very clear that little environmental migration was 
currently oriented towards the UK. This is captured by the following comment made 
during a discussion the expert discussion in round 2: 
‘What are the things that actually drive people to move from their country or 
their immediate surroundings to a country that is much further away? If you 
look at the flooding that happened in Pakistan (in 2010) … the whole area that 
was flooded was populated by people who are in a situation close to bonded or 
slave labour by landlords, and they got displaced and many of them don’t want 
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to go back even though that is where they have got a potential livelihood … 
but their decision is not to migrate to UK unless they already have links here. 
Their coping strategy is to say, I have family members close by that can 
provide me with temporary shelter while I get on my feet. …So my point is 
that migration is there, but it is not to the UK.’  
(Expert comment A, London, March 2011) 
As experts were asked to move further into the future in the estimates they 
made, so the commentary interpreting their estimates tended to diversify. Among 
those affirming low levels of environmental migration the following comment would 
represent a number of those who spoke out: 
‘I felt that while it (environmental migration) would still be at the very low 
end, it would still be a slight increase. But the key thing is the extent to which 
environmental migration leads to immigration into the UK. And my view is 
that while it will lead to a slight increase, my view is that it will still be very 
small.’  
(Expert comment B, London, March 2011) 
A variant of this position was as follows: 
‘If we get to 4 degrees (above current temperatures) then that will make some 
parts of the world quite difficult to live in. And if we’re thinking about flows 
within regions, there could be a massive increase by 2060, but not into the 
UK.’ 
(Expert comment C, London, March 2011) 
At the upper end of the responses from the main body of experts (i.e. 
environmental migrants accounting for 20–29% of all immigrants – see again Figure 
7), some justified their responses as follows:  
‘By 2060 from my point of view we will have more intra-European migration 
flows from countries likely to suffer from climate change and they are 
southern European countries basically because of water scarcity and issues 
like that. So I mean countries like the UK could be facing immigration flows 
coming from people that are pushed from southern Europe. That is why I have 
chosen a higher rank and in my mind that was due to regional migration’. 
(Expert comment D, London, March 2011) 
Comments such as that of expert D fed into subsequent minor re-assessment of 
some expert views of where future environmental migrants might come from, with 
more experts considering southern Europe to be a source region, but with few 
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removing the expectation that South and Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa would 
be important source regions (see again Figure 12). Hence, the experts’ comments 
included:   
‘I would have thought that from the comments made earlier that they (experts) 
would have down-rated South and Southeast Asia because of internal 
movements within those regions and upgraded Southern Europe’  
(Expert comment E, London, March 2011) 
and also:  
‘I still think that as you get to those longer (more distant) years, people might 
begin to lose everything because of environmental change. So if you have 
links to the UK, then you might see a slight increase in the long term… That is 
why it is still on my questionnaire, but it doesn’t detract from the argument 
that the bulk of it will be within the regions.’ 
(Expert comment F, London, March 2011) 
Third, an interesting observation from the research was that not only did the 
experts believe that environmental migration would increase over time (Table 14), but 
that after discussion in round 2 experts’ estimates were consistently lower than in 
Round 1 and by an increased amount as the survey moved from the current situation 
(5.74%) to the expected outcomes in 2060 (16.80%) 
 
Averages 
and 
standard 
deviation  
Level of environmental migration  
Current 2030 2060 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
Mean 
(%) 
 
6.52 4.81 13 11.85 18.5 16.8 
Median 
(%) 
  
5 5 10 10 15 15 
Standard 
deviation  9.82 6.13 12.55 9.83 17.23 13.9 
 
Table 14: Environmental migration estimates: current, 2030 and 2060 – Delphi rounds 1 and 2 
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Fourth, it was evident that a relationship existed between certain responses and 
the confidence that individual panel members had in their estimates. Tables 15 and 16 
use categorical data to indicate a tendency for those who were most confident in their 
estimates to suggest below-average proportions of migrants moving in association 
with environmental change. A Spearman’s rank correlation, using ordinal data from 
the survey, examined the relation between the estimated proportion of current 
migration attributed to environmental forces and confidence in the estimate. In other 
words, estimates of the proportion of current migration were ranked 1, 2, 3…through 
to 26 with 1 representing the highest proportion and 26 the lowest proportion. 
Similarly the confidence in estimates was ranked 1 to 26 with 1 representing the 
highest level of confidence and 26 the lowest level of confidence in an expert’s 
estimate. The test showed a statistically significant inverse association (Rs correlation 
coefficient = – 0.340; p = 0.041). Hence, those who were most confident in their 
estimates, suggested that environmental migration accounted for a very low level 
proportion of all current migration. It also emerged from the Delphi survey that those 
that estimated current environmental migration to be very low were also most fluent 
in articulating their arguments in round 2 in relation to the reasons why their views 
should prevail.   
 
Less than 50% 
confident 
50% plus confidence Total 
Below average 
(5.74%) current 
environmental 
migration 
5 14 19 
Above average 
(5.74%) current 
environmental 
migration 
4 4 8 
Total 9 18 27 
 
Table 15: Current migration related to environmental change 
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Less than 50% 
confident 
50% plus confidence Total 
Below average 
(11.85%) 
environmental 
migration 2030 
6 10 16 
Above average 
(11.85%) current 
environmental 
migration 2030  
5 5 10 
Total 11 15 26 
 
Table 16: Environmental migration in 2030   
 
 
An interesting extension of this point is examination of whether those who 
were more certain of the estimates had different views from other experts and also 
whether their position should be given greater weight. It could be argued for example, 
that an estimate that is made involving confidence levels less than 50% could be 
discarded, on the grounds that the expert is effectively signalling that their estimate is 
no more than a guesstimate which even they regard as little more than a possible 
future outcome. The researchers would argue that although self-confidence is an 
imperfect predictor of forecast accuracy, there are good grounds for excluding expert 
views where the expert acknowledges a considerable lack of certainty in their own 
estimates. It was therefore decided to re-run the survey results for three questions 
relating to future levels of environmental migration, using only those results where 
the experts themselves thought their estimates to be probable with 50% confidence or 
better. Tables 17–19 show the interesting outcomes that emerged.  
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All responses 
(N:14) 
Mean  10.71% 
Median  10.0% 
Standard deviation  9.43 
 
Table 17: Estimates of environmental migration in 2030, 
50%+ confidence only 
 
 
 
 All responses (N:9) 
Mean  23.33% 
Median  15.0% 
Standard deviation  20.62 
 
Table 18: Estimates of environmental migration in 2060, 
50%+ confidence only 
 
 
The analysis shows that, in contrast to those estimating current levels of 
environmental migration to the UK who tended to be more confident if making low 
estimates (Table 15), those who were most confident about estimates for 2030 
differed little from the total survey population (compare means in Tables 4 and 17). 
By 2060, however, those confident in their estimates made higher estimates than other 
experts (compare Tables 5 and 18). It should be noted however that the total number 
of responses is small. Confident experts placed the proportion of environmental 
migrants at 23.3% of total gross immigration to the UK compared with 16.8% for all 
respondents.  
 
Table 19 also shows some differences between those estimating with 
confidence and those included in the survey that were unsure about the position in 
2060. It suggests that those who feel best able to estimate environmental migration to 
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2060 estimate that only 11.4% of this flow will be the result of displacement moves 
compared with 16.4% of all respondents. The researchers believe that this refined 
estimate should be given more weight by the Foresight panel.  
 
 
 All responses (N:12) 
Mean  11.42% 
Median  7.5% 
Standard deviation  11.89 
 
Table 19: Estimates of displacement migration in 2060, 
50%+ confidence only 
 
A fifth and final observation in this discussion section concerns the relation 
between gross immigration levels and environmental migration levels. Some readers 
may have wondered why this report commenced from a discussion of gross 
immigration estimates, rather than simply commencing with issues of environmental 
mobility. This was done because, in the researchers’ view, the two cannot be treated 
independently, with environmental migration by definition always being nested within 
the wider flow of people to the country and also with the possibility that trends in 
environmental mobility will become a key driver of the overall level of migration to 
the UK in the future.   
 
Analysis of the statistical relation between expert estimates of gross migration 
and environmental migration are problematic, simply because a key assumption of 
inferential statistics is independence between variables. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to note that a significant Spearman rank correlation was found between the volume of 
gross immigration to the UK by 2030 and the level of environmental migration 
estimated by an expert for 2030 (Rs = 0.33; p = 0.048). The correlation was stronger 
for the demographic panel of the survey (Rs = 0.70; p = 0.008). For 2060 the 
correlation was also observed for the demographic panel at a similar level (Rs = 0.71; 
p = 0.008). It emerges therefore that those who are most confident about the reliability 
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of their forecasts of overall migration (demographers) also estimate lower levels of 
future environmental migration by 2030 and 2060 (Tables 4 and 5). 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The two rounds of the Delphi survey have produced quantitative measures of the 
extent to which future immigration to the UK will be influenced by environmental 
change. Of greater interest is the analysis offered in this report of the way in which 
uncertainty about future environmental migration might best be understood. 
In a situation in which experts anticipate a slight decline in overall levels of 
gross immigration to the UK, the Delphi survey suggested that environmental 
migration will rise from a current very low level to account for a more significant 
proportion of all movement into the UK (maybe up to 23%; Table 18). Experts 
suggest that this may occur even though future overall levels of gross immigration to 
the UK may be lower than at present (Figure 8). Critically, however, many experts 
have very low confidence in their estimates, making it essential to undertake an 
analysis of uncertainty levels in relation to forecasts of environmental mobility. 
Given the high levels of uncertainty, both in relation to estimates of future 
migration and also specifically in relation to environmental mobility, it is important 
that policy makers do not focus too strongly on any one ballpark figure, such as those 
that have been widely promoted in some quarters (Myers, 1993; Stern 2007). Much 
more important is the understanding offered by the results of the Delphi survey about 
the extent to which experts have confidence in their estimates and how best to 
interpret environmental migration estimates for 2030 and 2060.   
The survey suggests that very few environmental migrants (perhaps as low as 
11%; Table 19) will arrive as displacement movers, with the majority being driven in 
their decisions by demographic, social, political and economic forces affected by 
environmental change. There is a body of expert opinion that argues strongly for these 
migrants coming from Mediterranean Europe, a region currently with moderately 
open access to the UK under current EU legislation (Figure 13).   
Experts making low estimates of current environmental migration are more 
confident in the basis of their views than others, giving grounds perhaps to privilege 
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their estimates about the present situation and the likely outcomes for 2030 over those 
of other commentators. In the longer run, confidence in overall migration estimates 
and in environmental migration estimates is moderately weak, making long range 
forecasting more difficult and giving reason to look more favourably to Bayesian 
estimates that give more weight to linking future forecasts to the evidence of previous 
time series datasets, and to basing projections on a statistical appreciation of the 
evidence base about the past drivers of immigration. This latter suggestion is the 
subject of a related report by the authors (Abel et al., 2011) that draws directly on the 
understanding of migration and uncertainty that has been the focus of this Delphi 
survey. 
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Appendix 1: Survey form – Round 2 
 
 
 
 
Foresight Global Environmental Migration Project  
 
Delphi Survey of Immigration to the UK to 2060 with particular reference to 
Environmental Mobility  
 
NAME:  
 
Welcome to round 2 of the Foresight Delphi migration survey! 
1. Thank you for completing round 1 of our questionnaire survey and for attending this workshop.  
2. Today we will undertake round 2 of the survey. This will involve you being presented with the 
aggregated results of the round 1 questionnaire responses in anonymised form and your original 
completed questionnaire. You will then have an opportunity to discuss the issues in the questionnaire 
with other experts. The reason that there are two rounds is that the second one allows you to affirm or 
change your first round answers in light of the views of other experts. Please indicate your round 2 
answers using the red pen provided.   
3. Please note you are asked for your personal opinion as an expert, and NOT as a representative of any 
institution or employer.  
4. We wish to stress that this survey is ANONYMOUS and no individual opinions will be cited at any 
point. Your details and the information you provide will not be shared with any third parties.  
5. This survey, as well as the methodology on which it is based, is by nature subjective, so there are no 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ answers. Every intuition, even an ‘extreme’ one (in justified cases), counts. At the end 
of the survey there is an opportunity to express comments or concerns about particular questions. Please 
feel free to do so, as this can provide us with valuable information. It is implicitly assumed that these 
justifications can be anonymously quoted (without disclosing your name or organisation). If you 
explicitly do not wish that your opinion is quoted, you are kindly asked to check the appropriate box.  
 
Yours Sincerely 
      Professor Allan M Findlay                 Dr Jakub Bijak 
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 II 
Delphi survey on future UK immigration trends  
 
• Please respond to each question in the space provided  
• If you are unsure about any of the questions, please provide your best estimate. 
• If not stated otherwise, please choose ONE option from the possible answers provided.  
 
SECTION A: MIGRATION TRENDS TO 2030 AND 2060  
Current Migration 
1a) There were an estimated 567,000 immigrants to the UK in 2009. Recorded migration statistics 
clearly do not probe whether environmental circumstances have played any part in current decisions 
to move to the UK. What proportion, if any, of the current immigration do you think is either 
directly or indirectly due to factors associated with environmental change?  
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
1b) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you 
feel about your estimate in question 1a?  
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
Migration in 2030 
2a)  Bearing in mind once again the 567,000 immigrants to the UK in 2009, we want you now to consider 
future trends to 2030. Thinking about current circumstances and taking into account possibly relevant 
factors, what would you estimate to be the approximate future gross number of immigrants the UK 
will receive in the year 2030?  
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
2b) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you 
feel about your estimate in question 2a?       
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
 
 III 
3a) Of the migrants you expect to arrive in the UK in 2030, what proportion do you think will be due to 
environmental change?       
 Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
3b) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you 
feel about your estimate in question 3a?       
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
Migration in 2060 
4a) Thinking about the current circumstances and taking into account possibly relevant factors, what 
would you estimate to be the approximate future gross number of immigrants the UK will receive in 
the year 2060?       
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
4b) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you 
feel about your estimate in question 4a?        
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
5a) Of the number of migrants you expect to arrive in the UK in 2060, what proportion do you think 
will be due to environmental change?       
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
5b) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you 
feel about your estimate in question 5a?        
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
 
 
 
 IV 
6) Thinking about current circumstances and taking into account possibly relevant factors, what would 
you expect to be the likely general long-term tendency of total gross immigration to the UK until 
2060? Please select ONE option  
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
  6A) Constant                                          6B) Linear increase                            
            
      6C) Accelerating migration    6D) Ever-slower increase    6E) S-shaped increase     
                                                                                                                             
        
 6F) Linear decrease                  6G) Ever-slower decrease    6H) S-shaped decrease 
                                                                                                            
           
  
6I) Other trends (please describe):     
(e.g. ‘total gross immigration grows until year X and then decreases thereafter’) 
 
7) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you feel 
about the trend you have identified in question 6?         
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 V 
8) Please list where you think will be the two most important sources of environmental migrants to the UK 
by 2060. Please select TWO options  
Region  2060 
Round 1 Round 2 
Eastern European countries within the EU   
Southern European countries within the EU   
Other Western European countries within the EU    
North Africa    
Sub-Saharan Africa    
Middle East (Southwest Asia)    
South and Southeast Asia    
Island communities from the Pacific and Indian Oceans     
Australia and New Zealand    
North America    
Latin America    
Other (please specify)    
 
9) What do you believe is the likelihood that citizens of the European Union living in other parts of Europe 
will move to the UK as a result of adverse environmental change by 2030?  
Likelihood  2030 
Very probable  
Probable   
Possible   
Unlikely   
 
10a) By 2060 what proportion of environmental migrants to the UK do you believe might be displacement 
migrants (rapid or forced moves occurring as a matter of last resort) compared with other environmental 
migrants (e.g. where the environment is only one force of many contributing either directly or indirectly to 
international migration)?       
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
10b) How confident, measured by a percentage between 1 (very unsure) and 100 (very confident), do you 
feel about your estimate in question 10a?        
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 VI 
 
11) If you have any comments on questions 1–10 (or justifications for your answers), please provide them in 
the space below, together with the question number: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION B 
MIGRATION DRIVERS (ALL MIGRATION – NOT JUST ENVIRONMENTAL). 
 
12a) In your opinion what impact might an increase in the global population from the 2010 figure of 6.8 
billion to 9.1 billion by 2060 (due to a high global population growth rate) have on immigration to the UK 
between 2011 and 2060? Please, check ONE option  
 a) steady immigration growth? 
 b) even faster immigration growth? 
 c) slower immigration growth? 
 d) immigration decline? 
 e) The global population growth rate is not important for immigration in this case. 
Round 1 answer:  
Round 2 answer:  
 
12b) In your opinion what impact might an increase in the population of the Global South have on 
immigration to the UK between 2011 and 2060? Please, check ONE option 
 a) steady immigration growth? 
 b) even faster immigration growth? 
 c) slower immigration growth? 
 d) immigration decline? 
 e) Population growth in the Global South is not important for immigration in this case. 
Round 2 answer:  
 
 
 VII 
13) In your opinion what impact might changes in the global elderly dependency ratio (number of people 
aged 20–59 relative to those aged 60 plus) due to an ageing population in the Global North and a relatively 
young population in the Global South have on immigration to the UK between 2011 and 2060? Please, 
check ONE option  
 a) steady immigration growth? 
 b) even faster immigration growth? 
 c) slower immigration growth? 
 d) immigration decline? 
 e) The elderly dependency ratio is not important for immigration in this case. 
Round 2 answer:  
 
14a) In your opinion what impact might continued economic growth in the Global North (similar to that 
which occurred over the period 2000–07) until 2060 have on immigration to the UK between 2011 and 
2060? Please, check ONE option  
 a) steady immigration growth? 
 b) even faster immigration growth? 
 c) slower immigration growth? 
 d) immigration decline? 
 e) The economic growth rate in the Global North is not important for immigration in this case. 
Round 2 answer:  
 
14b) In your opinion what impact might continued economic growth in the Global South (similar to that 
which occurred over the period 2000–07) until 2060 have on immigration to the UK between 2011 and 
2060? Please, check ONE option  
 a) steady immigration growth? 
 b) even faster immigration growth? 
 c) slower immigration growth? 
 d) immigration decline? 
 e) The economic growth rate in the Global South is not important for immigration in this case. 
Round 2 answer:  
 
 
 
 
 VIII 
15) In your opinion what impact might high economic growth in rich countries and lagging growth in 
poorer countries (i.e. increased economic disparity) have on immigration to the UK between 2011 and 2060? 
Please check ONE option  
 a) steady immigration growth? 
 b) even faster immigration growth? 
 c) slower immigration growth? 
 d) immigration decline? 
 e) Global economic disparities are not important for immigration in this case. 
Round 1 answer: 
Round 2 answer:  
 
16) To what extent do you believe that UK citizens currently living in other parts of the world are likely to 
return to the UK as a result of adverse environmental change by 2060? Please select ONE option  
Likelihood  2060 
Round 1 Round 2 
Very probable   
Probable    
Possible    
Unlikely    
 
17) If you have any further comments on questions 12–15 (or justifications for your answers), please 
provide them in the space below, together with the question number: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you do not wish your anonymised comments and / or justifications from question 17 to be shared with 
other survey participants, please check the box:  
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETNG THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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